The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Introduction
The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the midst of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was hailed by some as a development that marked the beginning of the end of impunity for egregious human rights violations, ushering in an era in which global security policy would be underpinned by concern for the security of individuals and communities and not only the security of States. Others were much more sceptical, however, arguing that the international community of States, acting through the UN Security Council and its Chapter VII powers to maintain international peace and security, was setting up courts to prosecute atrocities it could have prevented from occurring in the first place, staging trials instead of putting their soldiers' lives on the line to protect civilians.
Neither side was wrong. The deliberations at the Security Council that led to the creation of the Tribunal were dominated by statements expressing concern for the plight of civilians in the Balkans and enthusiasm for a revival of the Nuremberg legacy that could pave the way for a permanent international criminal court. 2 In less than a decade, the International
Criminal Court had been established and questions of accountability and justice for serous international crimes were featuring regularly in global security discussions. Shortly after it had decided to put in place a tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council was preoccupied with the unfolding genocide in Rwanda. A twin court, the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was set up in the wake of the most dramatic failure of the international community since the end of the Cold War to prevent and stop mass slaughter:
"Law became a euphemism for inaction." 3 These early debates are still relevant because they highlight the need to analyse the role of international justice in the security arena at two levels: with respect to the evolving normative underpinnings of security concepts and practices and, at the same time, in relation to other security instruments that are employed (or not) by the international community alongside international justice. Understanding the distinctive logic of international justice as a security instrument is important but insufficient on its own; it has to be complemented by an examination of the interactions of international justice with other security instruments that are simultaneously deployed and brought to bear in a particular context, especially when such instruments may constrain or reinforce the pursuit of justice in significant ways. This article examines the security implications of international justice in the Balkans by situating the analysis within the broader context of international interventions in the region. It argues that the revival of international justice half a century after the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials could be interpreted as signaling a shift in security paradigms from statism to human rights while also giving rise to deep tensions between them. These tensions are most clearly expressed in the interactions of international justice with a set of security instruments associated with the 'liberal peace', which in one form or another have been routinely employed in situations where serious international crimes occur since the 1990s. 4 The argument is elaborated in relation to the Balkans, a region that has served as a laboratory for the international community in developing both transitional justice and liberal peace approaches to conflict-affected states. The concurrent evolution of these approaches over the past two decades has reinforced the idea that transitional justice is central to liberal peacebuilding and claims to that effect have become commonplace among practitioners and scholars. 5 The analysis presented here suggests that such claims should be treated with caution, however, and calls for a critical re-consideration of the relationship between transitional justice and the liberal peace. It also raises questions about a core set of critiques of the liberal peace that identify as the main problem the 'liberalism' of the interveners: "If only they were not, in various ways, so liberal, then it is alleged external intervention or assistance may potentially be much less problematic." 6 The contribution reflects the overall preoccupation of the special issue with 'security cultures' as an analytical lens for investigating the role of law and justice in global security.
A security culture combines a set of ideas and a set of practices that tend to reinforce each other. As Kaldor points out, a security culture is not a static concept; it is constructed and has to be continuously reproduced: "Understanding the mechanisms through which cultures are constructed enables us to identify openings and closures -points at which policy innovations are possible and where they are stuck… The aim is to substantiate specific security cultures 4 The article focuses on security instruments at the sharp end of the 'liberal peace', which refers to a broader set of interventions in fragile and conflict-affected states based on the idea that peace depends on the existence of liberal political and economic institutions that are functioning and effective, and aimed at constructing liberal polities, economies, and societies. See, e.g, A Bellamy, ' and the ways in which they are constructed so as to understand and interpret their different internal logics." 7 This approach is productive for examining international justice and the liberal peace because it draws attention to the ways in which their relationship is mediated by certain sets of ideas and practices that reflect particular logics and these logics, in turn, structure their interactions. Peace usually refers to peace between states, whereas human rights tend to be about the domestic arena. The liberal peace is statist in that the priority is peace between collective actors (the warring parties) rather than human rights, which are at the heart of the project of international justice. As a security culture, the liberal peace involves a combination of statist objectives and statist methods of enforcement that contradicts the logic of a human rights approach and complicates its pursuit in practice.
The article proceeds in three sections. The first section traces the evolution of international justice from its origins in the wake of World War II to its revival half a century later with the establishment of the Yugoslav Tribunal. The aim is to elaborate a distinctive conception of 'security' that emerges from this trajectory, addressing questions such as security for whom, security from what, and security by what means. The following section examines the jurisprudence of the ICTY to determine whether judicial practice has tended to promote this distinctive approach to security. The final section explores the interactions of international justice and liberal peace interventions in the Balkans, focusing in particular on three types of security instruments that have been deployed in the region in conjunction with international justice: peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
Reinventing Justice, Reframing Security
The foundations of international criminal justice were laid down by the Allies in the wake of His thesis was that the paramount crime was the launching and waging of the Second World War, and that individuals responsible for it should be held penally liable and tried accordingly. The criminal nature of the last war was found to derive from its aim and methods. The aims were to enslave foreign nations, to destroy their civilization and physically annihilate a considerable section of their population on racial, political or religious grounds. The methods arouse from the fact that it was a "total" war, which disregarded all humanitarian considerations lying at the root of the laws and customs of war, and introduced indiscriminate means of warfare and barbaric methods of occupation. The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned and waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity. War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent States but affect the whole world.
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.
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Nuremberg's obsession with aggression has been the subject of much criticism. One problem was the way it affected the framing of crimes against humanity, the other major innovation of the trials, by establishing a nexus to international armed conflict. Crimes against humanity could be prosecuted only in connection with either crimes against peace or war crimes, even though this charge was supposed to capture the crimes of the Holocaust.
Hannah Arendt observed that what had prevented the judges from doing full justice to crimes against humanity was that the Nuremberg Charter "demanded that this crime, which had so little to do with war that its commission actually conflicted with and hindered the war's conduct, was to be bound up with the other crimes." 14 [T]he tribunal will make it easier for the Bosnian people to reach a genuine peace.
The scars left on the bodies and in the minds of the survivors of this war will take time to heal. In too many places, neighbours were betrayed by neighbour and friend divided by friend by fierce and hostile passion. Too many families have assembled at too many cemeteries for us to say that ethnic differences in Bosnia do not matter. But responsibility for these crimes does not rest with Serbs or Croats or Muslims as peoples; it rests with the people who ordered and committed the crimes. The wounds opened by this war will heal much faster if collective guilt is expunged and individual responsibility is assigned.
22
This particular framing of the Tribunal's contribution to peace in the Balkans by individualising guilt for atrocity crimes was subsequently embraced by the judges and prosecutors as well; in fact, they have gone to great lengths to dispel any suspicion that that 
Adapting and Developing the Law
Although the pursuit of international justice in the Balkans appeared to promise a shift in security thinking and practice, it was also clear from the start that fulfilling that promise even partially was bound to involve grappling with serious challenges and was anything but predetermined. Some of the challenges were beyond the control of the Tribunal, for example arresting and transferring suspects to The Hague, but others were within its powers. This section examines a set of tensions and problems arising in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and considers the ways in which the judges have sought to respond by adapting and developing international law.
Adapting the law to the logic and purposes of the new paradigm has been pursued by the ICTY primarily in two ways: firstly, by addressing some of the statist assumptions of the Nuremberg paradigm and international humanitarian law to better reflect the character of the violence in the former Yugoslavia and, secondly, by extending the normative reach of the law to encompass new subjects and offenses that become important from a human rights perspective. There were two problems in applying the distinction to the Yugoslav wars of disintegration. First, the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not fit easily either the 'international' or 'internal' category. State borders in the former Yugoslavia were porous, shifting, and hotly contested; if anything, the character of the conflict appeared to be regional and transnational. 26 Second, the distinction was normatively loaded in a way that could not withstand critical scrutiny. Given the gravity of the violations committed in the region, the distinction risked frustrating the humanitarian purposes of the law and appeared unsustainable from a human rights perspective. In dealing with these problems, the ICTY has pursued a twofold approach in its jurisprudence. On the one hand, it has acknowledged that an armed conflict may have both international and non-international elements and has sought to determine under what circumstances an internal conflict may become 'internationalized'. the JCE and characterised the entire Judgement as contradicting "any sense of justice." 37 In
Croatia, the public and the State were galvanized by these verdicts, united first in condemnation and then in celebration of the rulings; in Serbia, the reverse was the case. 38 The other issue that has generated much controversy in recent years, both at the Tribunal and in the public domain, concerns aiding and abetting liability. It turns on whether the actus reus of this mode of liability requires 'specific direction', i.e. assistance provided by the accused to those who commit crimes that is specifically directed to aiding the commission of the crimes, or whether it is sufficient to establish knowledge that the aided forces are committing crimes and the aid provided would assist them in doing that. The ICTY Trial
Chamber rejected the specific direction standard and convicted Momčilo Perišić, former Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav armed forces, for aiding and abetting Bosnian Serb forces implicated in atrocities in Srebrenica and Sarajevo. 39 The Appeals Chamber, however, upheld the specific direction standard. Considering the nature of the aid and the suspect's remoteness from the theatre, it concluded that it could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt that the aid provided by Perišić was specifically directed to assist the commission of the crimes, and reversed the conviction. 40 As Marko Milanovic has pointed out, the implication of the approach adopted in the Perišić Appeal Judgement is that "it will be practically impossible to convict under aiding and abetting any political or military leader external to a conflict who is assisting one of the parties even while knowing that they are engaging in mass atrocities, so long as the leader is remote from the actual operations and is not stupid enough to leave a smoking gun behind him." 41 At the same time, shifting the lens from statism to human rights has enabled the Tribunal to extend the normative reach of the law in relation to the substantive offenses within its jurisdiction, making visible and prompting prosecution of certain types of human rights violations that had previously been overlooked or dismissed. In the Nuremberg paradigm, for example, atrocities involving civilians were often viewed as aberrations that were not dictated by the logic of 'total war' and in some cases directly conflicted with it by diverting resources away from the front and encumbering the war effort. This is one reason why the Holocaust appeared almost incomprehensible at Nuremberg, although once the shocking nature and scale of these atrocities had been revealed in the course of the proceedings they did move the judges and influenced their sentencing practices. 45 Other atrocities against civilians were typically understood as regrettable side effects of the hostilities, largely unrelated to the conduct of the war itself; as one contemporary commentator put it, "It should be remembered that these crimes are committed chiefly against enemy innocent civilians, non-combatants; One of the implications of the new paradigm of international justice that emerged in the 1990s was that certain types of human rights violations, which had been consistently neglected in the past, were coming into focus and taken up for prosecution and punishment.
Historically, wartime rape and other forms of sexual violence have been viewed as little more than an incidental by-product of armed conflict. The trials after World War II largely neglected abuses involving sexual violence, even in cases where such abuses had a direct relationship to the war effort such as the 'comfort women' system run by the Japanese military. 47 Half a century later the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy, argued that rape was still "the least condemned international crime."
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Amid reports of widespread and systematic rape in Bosnia, the Security Council explicitly referenced sexual assaults when it created the ICTY and incorporated rape as a crime against humanity in the Statute. 49 Richard Goldstone notes that the strong condemnation of sexual violence was a key aspect of the motivation for establishing the Tribunal in the first place. At the same time, the ICTY conditionality was applied rather unevenly in the SAP, raising the issue of selectivity, and created divisions in the EU as some Member States insisted on a principled approach while others preferred compromise and accommodation.
The tensions were expressed most clearly when the EU was using the war crimes issue to advance strategic considerations for stability and public order at the expense of the SAP's normative commitments to accountability and human rights. 68 In the case of Croatia, the EU suspended accession negotiations over its failure to apprehend Gotovina and reopened them only after the Tribunal had been satisfied with Croatia's efforts to cooperate. In the case of Serbia, however, the ICTY conditionality was repeatedly compromised and used by the EU as a bargaining chip in order to influence political developments in the country and to shape its response to Kosovo's declaration of independence. Jelena Subotić observes that in that context "the issue of justice for crimes against humanity became an issue of the lowest order, a matter of deal making and compromise setting, removed as far as possible from the ideas and norms of dealing with the past." 69 With the completion of the Tribunal's remaining cases in sight, the EU has started to shift attention in the SAP from international justice to domestic prosecution of war crimes. So far, however, the focus has been on building capacity for conducting such trials at the various domestic and hybrid courts in the region, rather than
requiring applicant countries to demonstrate effective investigation and prosecution of war crimes.
Conclusion
The pursuit of international justice in the former Yugoslavia half a century after the Nuremberg trials signals a shift in security paradigms from statism to human rights, while also giving rise to deep tensions and contradictions between them. Judicial practice at the ICTY has tended to advance this shift by adapting and developing the law in line with a human rights approach to security but it has not been immune to setbacks and interference, especially when the jurisprudence of the Tribunal has appeared to challenge entrenched interests and practices of States. To the extent that the exercise of international justice depends on States for enforcement and for its continued existence, the Yugoslav case suggests that there are inherent tensions between statism and human rights that cannot be addressed by judicial bodies alone, in the absence of a parallel shift in the security thinking and practices of States.
These tensions have affected the ability of international justice to offer a security strategy in the Balkans in important ways. The potential of international justice to promote a rights-based approach to security has been repeatedly compromised when liberal peace interventions in the region have been working at cross-purposes with international justice.
Key security instruments that have been employed by the international community in the Balkans, such as peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, reflect a set of state-centric ideas about security and involve related security practices that often disrupt the pursuit of international justice and undermine its logic and purposes. The interactions of international justice with such instruments could be understood as a series of tensions between elitemediated peace deals, force protection priorities and an overarching concern for stability, on the one side, and normative commitments to promote accountability and enforce human rights, on the other. When key international actors engaged in the Balkans have viewed stability and justice as competing security strategies, the former has tended to trump the latter in practice.
As a security culture, the liberal peace in its current form involves a set of state-centric ideas and practices that cannot be easily reconciled with the distinctive rights-centric conception of security advanced by international justice and often undermine its logic and purposes. More research is needed to illuminate the complex relationship between liberal peace interventions and justice instruments in situations where both are deployed. The
Balkan case, however, calls into question the widespread assumption that transitional justice is an integral part of liberal peacebuilding and suggests that analysis along those lines may be misguided and counterproductive. Finally, the tensions between international justice and the
